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Constitutional Sex Discrimination*
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Lisa Baldez, & Tasina
Nitzschke Nihiser*

Abstract
Nearly thirty years have elapsed since the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Craigv. Boren, a landmark case in the
Court's constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence. In
Craig, the justices pronounced that they would apply
neither the lowest level of scrutiny-rational basis-nor the
highest level-strict scrutiny-to evaluate claims of sex
* Please

send all correspondence to Lee Epstein. Email:
epstein@artsci.wustl.edu; Post: Department of Political Science,
Washington University, CB 1063, 1 Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO
63130.
**Lee Epstein is the Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University
Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law at Washington
University; Andrew D. Martin is Assistant Professor of Political
Science at Washington University; Lisa Baldez is Associate Professor
of Government at Dartmouth College; Tasina Nitzschke Nihiser is a
Ph.D. student at Washington University. We are grateful to the
National Science Foundation, the Center for New Institutional Social
Science, the Washington University School of Law, and the
Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy,
for supporting our research. We also owe thanks to participants in
Washington University's Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law
("WERL"), Susan Appleton, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Nancy Staudt for
offering many useful suggestions; and to Scott Friedman, David
Lewarchik, Shelby Johnston, and Peter Ryan for outstanding research
assistance. We used R, SPSS, and Stata to conduct the analyses
presented in this paper. The project's web site
(http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html) houses a full
replication archive, including a database containing all the cases and
variables we used in this study, as well as the documentation necessary
to reproduce our results.
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discrimination. Rather, the Court invoked a standard "in
between" the two, now known as intermediate or
heightened scrutiny. Under this approach, the Court asks
whether a law challenged on equal protection grounds is
substantially related to the achievement of an important
objective.
Certainly the CraigCourt's intermediate approach has
its supporters; indeed, influential legal scholars are now
advocating that courts adopt it to evaluate laws
discriminating against gays and lesbians. But to many
analysts, Craig(and its progeny) was and remains highly
problematic. Among their claims is that the standard it
instantiated is so "loose" and "amorphous" that it produces
unpredictable results.
In this article, we seek to bring some empirical teeth to
this debate by exploring patterns in sex discrimination
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court and in state courts of
last resort. Our chief finding is that the critics of
heightened scrutiny probably have the better case. At the
very least, the Craigstandard-while generating outcomes
more favorable to parties alleging sex discrimination than
did the traditional rational basis test-does, in fact, lead to
far less predictable results than either rational basis or strict
scrutiny. For reasons that may have little to do with the
standard itself, courts are just as likely to uphold sex-based
classifications as they are to eradicate them.
This finding has important implications for the future of
sex discrimination litigation, as well as for the
advancement of legal rights for gays and lesbians. As to
the former, our results underscore the importance of
elevating the standard used to adjudicate sex discrimination
claims-a goal, as we demonstrate, that could be achieved
in several distinct ways. As to gays and lesbians, our
findings identify the possible costs and benefits associated
with a litigation strategy designed to place their claims of
discrimination in the intermediate scrutiny basket.
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I. Introduction
Nearly thirty years have elapsed since the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Craigv. Boren,' a landmark in its
constitutional sex discrimination jurisprudence. 2 In Craig,
' 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
2Id. We follow Mary Anne Case, ConstitutionalSex Discrimination:
The Law as a QuestforPerfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447,
1447 (2000) and "use the term 'sex discrimination' to refer to
discrimination between males and females." The vast majority of
Supreme Court inquiries into denials of equal protection on grounds of

3
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the justices pronounced that they would apply neither the
lowest level of scrutiny-rational basis-nor the highest
level- strict scrutiny--to evaluate claims of sex
discrimination. 3 Rather, they would invoke a standard "in
between" the two, now known as intermediate or
heightened scrutiny. Under this approach, the Court asks
whether a law challenged on equal protection grounds is
substantially related to the achievement of an important

sex-our chief concern in this Article-have focused on this type of
discrimination, that is, "on deprivations caused by rules that, on their
face, distinguish between males and females." Id.
3 Since we provide more details about these levels of scrutiny in Part
II, suffice it to note here that prior to Craig,the Court.invoked a twotier approach to equal protection claims. Under this model, the Justices
upheld legislation so long as it was rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose, unless that legislation
impinged upon a "fundamental right" or classified on the
basis of a "suspect trait" like race or ethnicity. Where a
law employed a "suspect classification" or restricted the
exercise of a "fundamental right," the Court applied "strict
scrutiny," requiring that the government establish that the
legislation was necessary to a compelling governmental
objective and that no less restrictive alternative was
available.
Peter S. Smith, The Demise of Three-Tier Review. Has the United
States Supreme CourtAdopted a "SlidingScale" Approach Toward
Equal ProtectionJurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475, 477 (1997).
See also LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE (2004);
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2003); SUSAN G.

MEZEY, ELUSIVE EQUALITY (2003); Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v.
INS and the Application of IntermediateScrutiny to Gender
Classifications,30 PEPP. L. REv. 185 (2003); Michael C. Dorf, The
Paths to LegalEquality, 90 CAL L. REv. 791 (2002); Gerald Gunther,
Foreword:In Search ofEvolving Doctrineon a ChangingCourt: A
Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1971); Risa
E. Kaufman, State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women's
Equality by EliminatingReproductive-BasedDiscrimination,24 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (2001).

4
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objective.
Since Craig,the Court has tinkered with this "inbetween" standard. Most notably, in United States v.
Virginia (the "VMJ case") 5 it seemed to "ratchet up"
Craig,6 stating that it would require an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" to sustain a sex-based
classification. 7 Tinkering, as it turns out, is the operative
word. Despite the speculation of some commentators, 8 and
4 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
5 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
6 Martha C. Daughtrey, Women

and the Constitution, 75 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 1, 21 (2000) (suggesting that in VMI, "Justice Ginsburg ratcheted
up the already 'heightened scrutiny' another notch or two."); see also
Dorf, supra note 3 (claiming that "United States v. Virginia arguably
ratcheted up the level ofjudicial scrutiny applicable to sex
classifications from intermediate to nearly strict."); infra notes 8 and 9.
7 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Parties who seek
to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action. Today's skeptical
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex
responds to volumes of history."). Some trace this language back to
Mississippi Univ.for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982) and
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127,136 (1994). See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 3 at n. 17 (asserting that "in recent gender
discrimination challenges, the Court has applied a super-heightened
scrutiny to equal protection challenges. The language for this
redefinition of intermediate review derives from Hogan (requiring that
gender-based governmental action demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification.')."); see also David K. Bowsher, Cracking the
Code ofUnited States v. Virginia, 48 DUKE L.J. 305,320 (1998); Jason
M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-BasedAffirmative Action under United
States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly PersuasiveJustification" Standard,
86 CAL L. REv. 1169,1170 (1998); Laura Weinrib, ProtectingSex:
Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discriminationin Nguyen v. INS,
12 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 222,228 (2003).
8 As Heather L. Stobaugh notes:
Over the years, commentators have argued that Justice
Ginsburg's use of "skeptical scrutiny" and her heavy
reliance on the "exceedingly persuasive justification"
language in the majority opinion of Virginia introduced a

5
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even Court members, 9 United States v. Virginia has hardly
generated a sea-change in the Court's approach to sex
discrimination. In fact, in its most recent forays into the
area the majority of the Court backed off Virginia,10
stricter test into cases involving gender-based
classifications as opposed to the traditional level of
intermediate scrutiny established in Craig v. Boren.
Heather L. Stobaugh, The Aftermath of-United States v. Virginia, 55
SMU L. REv. 1755, 1755 (2002). For commentary illustrating
Stobaugh's claim, see, e.g., Steven A. Delchin, United States v.
Virginia and OurEvolving "Constitution": Playing Peek-a-boo with
the Standardof Scrutinyfor Sex-Based Classifications,47 CASE W.
RES. L. REv 1121, 1134 (1997) (arguing that "VM! may be the
instrument for establishing strict scrutiny"); Cass Sunstein, Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 6, 73 (1996).
9 For example, in his dissent in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at
574, Justice Scalia accused the majority of"a de facto abandonment of
... intermediate scrutiny." See also Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 22,
who writes that "in an address to the University of Virginia School of
Law shortly after the VMIdecision was announced, [Justice Ginsburg
said,] 'There is no practical difference between what has evolved and
the ERA."'
10 Since VMI, the Court has decided two cases mounting constitutional
challenges to sex-based classifications, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420
(1998) and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). In both, it upheld the
classification and invoked the specter of Craig,rather than VM, in the
process. As to Miller,the majority wrote, "[e]ven if, as petitioner and
her amici argue, the heightened scrutiny that normally governs gender
discrimination claims applied in this context, we are persuaded that the
requirement imposed by § 1409(a)(4) on children of unmarried male,
but not female, citizens is substantially related to important
governmental objectives." Miller, 523 U.S. at 434 n. 11 (citation
omitted). Many scholars argue that this language "cannot be squared
with... Court doctrine prohibiting sex-based classifications that are
not supported by 'exceedingly persuasive justifications'." Cornelia T.
L. Pillard and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power, 1998 SuP. CT. REv. 1 (1998). See also Kristin Collins, When
Fathers'Rightsare Mothers'Duties, 109 YALE L. J. 1669 (2002);
Emily J. Gelhaus, The New Lower Standardfor Equal Protection
Claims ConcerningGender, 71 U. CN. L. REv 305. As to Nguyen, the
Court's majority claimed that "[fror a gender-based classification to

6
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retreating to the familiar territory of Craig." "The message
of United States v. Virginia," turned out to be "no different
from Craig: gender classifications are subject to

withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established 'at least that
the [challenged] classification serves important governmental
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' Nguyen,
533 U.S. at 60. Because the Court once again relied on the standard
articulated in Craig rather than the standard of VMI and Nguyen, many
scholars argue that this represented "a marked shift away from the
Court's gender-based equal protection analysis set forth in Virginia."
Stobaugh, supra note 8, at 1756. See also Dorf, supra note 3, at n. 93
(suggesting that while "United States v. Virginia arguably ratcheted up
the level ofjudicial scrutiny ... Nguyen ... ratcheted it back down.").
Stobaugh speculates that this "retreat" from Virginia occurred because
five Justices united to pull in the reins on the use of the
"exceedingly persuasive justification," which they believe
imposes a higher level of scrutiny on gender-based
classifications under Justice Ginsburg's Virginia opinion.
In other words, five Justices saw this area of the Court's
jurisprudence moving in a direction they did not
support-toward treating gender as a suspect class-and
they used Nguyen to prevent that result.
Stobaugh, supra note 8 at 1757.
11 See Weinrib, supra note 7, at 227 (stating that "in light of the
landmark anti-discriminatory outcome of United States v. Virginia...
the apparent retreat in Nguyen came to many as an unpleasant
surprise."); Stobaugh, supra note 8, at 1756 (noting that "[d]espite such
scholarly speculation about Virginia'spositive impact on future
gender-based equal protection claims, it now appears not enough
weight was given to those Justices who had expressed a strong dislike
for the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' language and had
disapproved of Justice Ginsburg's heavy reliance on it."); Bowsher,
supra note 7, at 318 ("The Court has repeatedly applied the standard
expressed in Craig without any further changes to the message."). Also
worth noting are Bowsher's findings, at 306-07, that "[o]f the six
federal Courts of Appeals that have considered whether United States v.
Virginia heightened the standard of scrutiny, five have concluded that it
did not."

7
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intermediate scrutiny."12
Certainly Craig'sintermediate approach has its
supporters; 3 influential legal scholars are now advocating
that courts adopt it to evaluate laws discriminating against
gays and lesbians. 14 But to many analysts, Craig (and its
12 Bowsher, supranote 7, at 320. But see Edward M. Gaffney, Curious
Chiasma, 4 U. PENN.J. CONST. L. 394,396-97 (2002) (claiming that "if
the formal language of the standard used to evaluate claims of gender
discrimination is not strict scrutiny, it is something very close to that
sort of exacting review. It rarely meets a classification that it likes ....
From Hoyt v. Floridato United States v. Virginia, the movement in the
protection of gender equality has been from low to high, from toothless
irrationality to de facto strict scrutiny.").
13See, e.g., Bowsher, supra note 7, at 317-18 (arguing that "despite the
objections of three members of the CraigCourt, intermediate scrutiny
has since proven to be very workable."); Collin O'Connor Udell,
SignalingA New Direction in Gender ClassificationScrutiny, 29
CoNN. L. REv. 521, 548 (1996) (claiming that "from a feminist
perspective, the intermediate scrutiny standard was certainly preferable
to the 'mere rationality' formulation," but also asserting that "we can
do better [than Craig].");Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 n.9 (1982) ("when a classification expressly discriminates on
the basis of gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny... does not vary
simply because the objective appears acceptable to individual Members
of the Court.").
14 Some commentators urge the application of heightened scrutiny to
laws that discriminate between homosexuals and heterosexuals, that is,
these analysts "seek to gamer intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays."
Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The LiteraryArgumentfor
HeightenedScrutinyfor Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753. See, e.g., Ann
Shalleck, RevisitingEquality: Feminist Thought About Intermediate
Scrutiny, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 31 (1997) ("As in the struggle for
women's equality, heightened constitutional scrutiny matters both
symbolically and practically in the movement for gay and lesbian
rights."); Yoshino, at 1756 ("In the near future, the United States
Supreme Court is likely to consider the argument that gays should
receive heightened scrutiny... The main purpose of this Article is to
strengthen [that] argument.") Another group of commentators suggest
that discrimination against gays and lesbians is, in fact, discrimination
on the basis of sex. Hence, courts should apply the same level of
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation as they do for

8
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progeny) was and remains highly problematic. Among
their claims is that the standard it instantiated is so
"loose"15 and "amorphous" 16 that it produces unpredictable
results17-So much so that it was "only a partial victory in
women's rights advocates' campaign for equality." 18
In this article we seek to bring some empirical teeth
to this debate by exploring patterns in sex discrimination
litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court and in state courts of
last resort.' 9 Our chief finding is that the critics of
laws that discriminate on the basis of sex. See Andrew Koppelman,
Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning ofGender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187. See also Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN.
L. REv. 45, 81 (1996) (stating that an "equality-based argument against
antigay policies is that such policies constitute gender discrimination
....When one is barred from entering into a marriage with a same-sex
partner who satisfies all other legal criteria of marriage eligibility, then
one has been denied a marriage license solely because of sex. This
triggers intermediate scrutiny."); Andrea L. Clausen, Marriageof
Same-Sex Couples in Iowa, 6 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 451, 461
(2002) ("[I]f the Iowa Supreme Court were to recognize denial of
same-sex marriage as a sex-based claim, but did not want to classify
sex as a suspect class, the court could use intermediate scrutiny.");
SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: AWEAPON OF SExISM (1988).

See

also infra Part IV. For commentary advocating the use of intermediate
scrutiny in other areas, see Rosemary M. Kennedy, The Treatment of
Women Prisonersafter the VMIDecision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW
65 (1997) and Tamra M. Boyd, Keeping the Constitution's Promise:An
Argumentfor GreaterJudicialScrutiny of FederalAlienage
Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REv. 319 (2001).
15 Justice David Souter, quoted in Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1190.
16 Joan A. Lukey and Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need a Federal
EqualRights Amendment?, 44 BoSTON BAR J. 10, 26 (2000).
See also, John Galotto, Strict Scrutinyfor Gender,via Croson, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 508, 545 (1993) (writing that the "standard is chafing
at the Court and [unconvincing] to most scholars.").
18 Shalleck, supra note 14, at 33.
19 In Part III, we explain why we focus on state courts of last resort
rather than on the lower federal bench. Suffice it to note here that

9
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heightened scrutiny probably have the better case. At the
very least, the Craig standard-while generating outcomes
more favorable to parties alleging sex discrimination than
did the traditional rational basis test-does, in fact, lead to
far less predictable results than either rational basis or strict
scrutiny. Courts are, for reasons that may have little to do
with the standard itself, just as likely to uphold sex-based
classifications as they are to eradicate them.
This finding has important implications for the
future of sex discrimination litigation, as well as for the
advancement of legal rights for gays and lesbians. As to
the former, our results underscore the importance of
elevating the standard used to adjudicate sex discrimination
claims-a goal, as we demonstrate, that could be achieved
in several distinct ways. As to gays and lesbians, our
findings identify the possible costs and benefits associated
with a litigation strategy designed to place their claims of
discrimination in the intermediate scrutiny basket. 20
We arrive at these implications in three steps. We
begin in Part II with a description of the three-tier approach
federal courts use to analyze claims of discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
along with a long-standing critique of that approach-that
it leads, especially in the mid-level tier, to indeterminate
results. In Part III, we demonstrate that this critique has
merit. In particular, we show that while the application of
the lowest and highest standards does, in fact, lead to rather
predictable outcomes, the "in-between" standard does not.
This result leads us in Part IV to emphasize the importance
of elevating sex to the highest level of scrutiny and to
question efforts designed to treat discrimination against
gays and lesbians as sex discrimination-at least until
because all three levels of scrutiny have been used in these courts to
adjudicate claims of constitutional sex discrimination, they provide

excellent laboratories for exploring patterns in this area of the law.
20 See supranote 14 and infra Part IV B.

10
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courts move away from Craig'sin-between test.
II. Equal Protection and the Supreme Court
To say that the Supreme Court's equal protection
jurisprudence has generated its fair share of commentary
over the past few years is to make a rather uncontroversial
claim. In fact, in the wake of recent decisions in the areas
of sex discrimination, 2 ' affirmative action,22 and gay
rights, 23 scholars have scrutinized virtually every aspect of
the Justices' approach to classifications based on sex, race,
sexual orientation, and the like. 24 We do not intend to
review the range of commentary, which would require a
book or two. Instead we have two objectives. First, since
an appreciation of current debates over Craig and its
progeny requires some knowledge of the Court's three-tier
approach to equal protection, we provide a brief overview
of it in Part II A. Not much more is necessary since it has
been so well described elsewhere.25 Second, since we
explicitly seek to put the debate on firmer empirical
ground, we identify in Part II B the chief claims of both
proponents and opponents of the Court's jurisprudence,
first with regard to the determinancy of the results yielded
by the current three-tier approach, and then with particular
emphasis on its application to sex discrimination.

21 See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
22 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger,

539

U.S. 244 (2003).
23 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), reh 'gdenied, 124 S.Ct. 35
(2003).
4 For a recent and particularly insightful analysis, see Robert C. Post,

Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2003).
25 For a sampling of work, see supra note 3.
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A. The Three- TierApproach to Equal Protection
To analyze claims of discrimination under the
26
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
judges, at least until Craig, applied one of two standards. 27
Under the traditional rational basis test, as Table 1 shows,
courts presume the validity of whatever classification the
government has made (e.g., allowing only those over the
age of 18 to enter into contracts, or permitting only M.D.s
to perform surgery); it is up to the party challenging the law
to establish that it is irrational. Since this burden is difficult
to meet, the conventional view among scholarly
commentators is that rational basis leads to a predictable
outcome: courts defer to the government, generally
upholding its classification.28

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
restricted to the states; the governing constitutional provision for claims
of discrimination against the federal government is the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For purposes of our discussion on sex
discrimination, the two clauses are interchangeable.
27 We adopt and adapt some of the discussion in this Part
from Lee
Epstein et al., Do We Still Need an ERA? at
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/ERA.html.
28 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3; MEZEY, supra note 3;
Barbara A. Brown et al., The EqualRights Amendment: A
ConstitutionalBasisfor EqualRightsfor Women, 80 YALE L. J. 871
(1971); Gunther, supra note 3; Kaufman, supranote 3. As we
foreshadowed in Part I, some contemporary commentators take issue
with this prediction.
For their views, see Part II B.
26

12
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Table 1. Equal protection tests

Test

Example of
Application

Rational Basis

Age discrimination

The law must be a reasonablemeasure designed to achieve a legitimate government
purpose,

Intermediate scrutiny

Sex discrimination

The law must be substantiallyrelated to
the achievement of an important objective.

Strict scrutiny

Race discrimination

The law must be the least restrictive
means available to achieve a compdling
state interest.

Validity Standard

Until the 1970s, the vast majority of claims of
discrimination proceeded under the rules of the traditional
rational basis test-with one particularly relevant
exception: race. In light of the history surrounding
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has
held that classifications based on race should be subject to a
less surmountable standard, known as "strict scrutiny" (or
"suspect class").30 Under this standard, judges presume
that a government action is suspect or unconstitutional.
Only by showing that the law is the least restrictive means
available to achieve a compelling state interest can the
government overcome that presumption (see Table 1).
Given the difficulty of making this showing, a conventional
EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 645. See also supra note 3 and
infra note 89.
30 See supporting citations supra note 3.
29
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wisdom emerged: the application of strict scrutiny
generally leads to outcomes just as predictable as those
under rational basis--only, of course, in the opposite
direction: when courts apply this stricter test, they almost
always rule in favor of the party alleging discrimination.
Or, as Gunther famously put it, the suspect class test is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact," whereas the traditional
rational basis standard provides "minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact."'"
It is thus no wonder that as part of their attempt to
eradicate discrimination, women's rights groups, beginning
in the late 1960s, attempted to convince courts that sexbased classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny
rather than to a rational basis analysis.32 Their litigation
efforts did not succeed, but neither did they wholly fail. In
response to their claims, the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig
v. Boren33 articulated a new standard, often called
intermediate or heightened scrutiny, that falls somewhere
between rational basis and strict scrutiny. 34 Under it, the
31 Gunther, supra note 3, at 8. Justice O'Connor has taken issue with
this claim, asserting strict scrutiny is not always "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact." Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338. Some scholars agree, arguing
more broadly, as we do in Part II B, that the standard three-tier
approach fails to produce reliable expectations. Nonetheless, it is true
that many contemporary commentators suggest that Gunther's assertion
remains generally apt. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3;
MEZEY, supra note 3; Farber et al., supra note 3; Lukey, supra note 16.
See also Part III for our attempt to empirically evaluate this debate.
32 For descriptions of these efforts, see generally Daughtrey, supra note
6; Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Beyond Legislative Lobbying:
Women's Rights Groups and the Supreme Court, 67 JUDICATURE 134
1983).
3 Craig,429 U.S. at 218.
34 For a history of the litigation leading up to Craig, including the
Court's decisions in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontierov.
Richardson,411 U.S. 677 (1973), see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Daughtrey, supra note 6;

Gaffney, supra note 12; Weinrib, supra note 7.
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challenged law must be substantially related to the
achievement of an important government objective (see
Table 1)."
Many argue that application of intermediate
scrutiny leads to more favorable outcomes for parties
alleging sex discrimination than did the traditional
standard. 36 At the same time, though, they suggest that the
intermediate approach, as opposed to rational basis or strict
scrutiny, produces far less predictable results: the Court
may more often than not void sex-based classifications, but
it more than occasionally upholds them.
B. Assessments of the Three-TierApproach
As we noted at the onset of this section, no shortage
of critical commentary exists on the Court's three-tier
approach to equal protection. Some comes from the bench
itself, such as Justice Stevens's statement that "there is only
one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply
35 As we explained in Part I, in UnitedStates v. Virginia, the majority
articulated a variation on this approach which would require an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" to sustain a sex-based
classification. See supra note 7. But in its two most recent cases the
Court "retreated" to the standard articulated in Craig. See supra note
10.
36 See, e.g., Udell, supra note 13 (noting that "from
a feminist
perspective, the intermediate scrutiny standard was certainly preferable
to the 'mere rationality' formulation"). See also LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN,
CONTEMPORARY CASES IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1994); Case, supra note
2.
37 See, e.g., MEZEY, supra note 3; Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect
Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender
Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953 (1996); Erin Chlopak,
MandatoryMotherhood andFrustratedFatherhood: The Supreme
Court's Preservationof Gender Discriminationin American
Citizenship, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 967 (2002); Deutsch, supra note 3;
Lukey, supra note 16.
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one standard of review in some cases and a different
standard in other cases. 38 There are numerous critics of the
heightened scrutiny standard in particular. Mary Ann Case,
for example, asserts that "the components" of the
intermediate standard "have rarely been the moving parts in
a Supreme Court sex discrimination decision, 39 whereas
Jason Skaggs points out the inconsistency of "subject[ing]
gender-based affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny
gender-based classifications under
while analyzing all other
' 4°
scrutiny.
intermediate
These scholars make interesting and useful points.
Especially relevant for our project, though, are analyses
centering on the reliability of the results yielded by the
three-tier approach. 4' The issue raised in these analyses38 Craig,429 U.S. at 211-12. Justice Stevens was responding to a
potential critique of the now three-tiered, as opposed to the traditional

two-tiered, approach. As he goes on to say: "Whatever criticism may be
leveled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least three such

standards applies with the same force to a double standard."

39 Case, supra note 2, at 1449. Rather, she says, "to determine whether
there is unconstitutional sex discrimination, one need generally ask
only two questions: 1) Is the rule or practice at issue sex-respecting,
that is to say, does it distinguish on its face between males and
females? and 2) Does the sex-respecting rule rely on a stereotype?"

Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1174-75. For other critiques, see Shalleck,
supra note 14 (strict-scrutiny standard as applied to gender issues also
40

important for gay and lesbian rights); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v.

Albright: Problemsof Constitutionalizationin FamilyLaw, 79 B.U. L.
REv. 1139 (1999). For more general commentary on the Court's
jurisprudential posture toward women's rights, see JUDITH A. BAER,
OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST

JURISPRUDENCE (1999) (suggesting that it has worked to reinforce male

dominance).
41 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. Cn. L.
REv. 1, 83 (2002):
Reliability, [in empirical research], is the extent to

which it is possible to replicate a measurement,
reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it
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whether various legal standards produce predictable and
consistent outcomes-is important for many reasons, not
the least of which is the implication for the norm of stare
decisis. If courts decline to follow precedential rules of law
or do so in unpredictable ways, they risk undermining their
fundamental efficacy. Members of the legal and political
communities predicate future expectations on the
assumption that others will follow existing rules. Should
courts make radical changes or apply rules inconsistently,
these communities may be left unable to adapt.42
From this general logic emerge two specific
critiques of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
One, which has emerged in recent years, suggests that a
three-tier approach no longer provides an adequate
framework for reliable expectations about court decisions;
the other, a more conventional view we previewed in Part
is the right one) on the same standard for the same
subject at the same time. If any one of us stepped on
the same bathroom scale 100 times in a row, and if
the scale [was] working properly, it would give us the
same weight 100 times in a row-even if that weight
is not accurate. (In contrast, a scale that is both

reliable and valid will give a reading that is both the
same and accurate 100 times in a row.) In other
words, in empirical research we deem a measure
reliable when it produces the same results repeatedly
regardless of who or what is actually doing the
measuring.
Id. This, it seems to us, is very similar to the criteria many
commentators use to evaluate the predictability of legal
standards.
42 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, supra note 34;
Jack Knight &
Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL ScI. 1018. It is
along similar lines that scholars are concerned with reliability. They
suggest that unreliable measurement procedures might provide
evidence that the researcher, however inadvertently, has biased a
measure in favor of a personal hypothesis, which can then undermine

any inferences reached therein. See Epstein & King, supra note 41, at
83.
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IIA, asserts that while intermediate scrutiny may be
relatively unpredictable, the two lowest and highest tiers
are not. As a general matter, the application of rational
basis leads courts to uphold classifications and the
application of strict scrutiny leads courts to strike them
down.
Those who believe that the standard equal
protection framework no longer produces uniform results
(if, in fact, it ever did) do so for various reasons. For
Ashutosh Bhagwat, the problem is that the "the Court has
failed to develop any coherent framework regarding how,
in applying the tiers of scrutiny, courts are to assess
whether the governmental interest asserted satisfies the
requirements of the level of scrutiny at issue. 43 In Robert
Post's view, the Court can circumvent the three-tier
approach altogether by strategically avoiding (even
obvious) equal protection arguments. 44 The commonalities
among these and other critiques, however,45may be more
43 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests:
Equal ProtectionJurisprudenceat the Crossroads, 4 U. PA. J. CONST.

L. 260, 270 (2002).
44 Post, supra note 24, at 99-101. He specifically points to Lawrence v.
Texas, 124 S. Ct. 441 (2003), in which passages in the majority's
opinion "sound almost entirely in equal protection," but which the
Court decided on due process grounds. Id. at 99. Post argues that the
justices took this route to avoid determining "whether classifications
based upon sexual orientation should receive elevated scrutiny or
merely rational basis review." Id. at 100. Such strategic
"instrumentation" on the part ofjudges seems to occur in other areas of
the law, in other forms, and for a range of reasons. See Lee Epstein et
al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the Supreme Court: An Empirical
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002); Emerson H. Tiller &
Pablo T. Spiller, StrategicInstruments: Legal Structure and Political
Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349, 362 (1999).
45 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 476 (asserting "[t]he Rehnquist
Court is moving away from [a three-tiered scheme of review] toward a
more flexible approach. Moreover, even under the three-tier
framework, the Court balances the importance of the rights or interests
at stake with the government's justification for the discriminatory
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interesting than their differences. Broadly speaking, the
argument advanced in study after study of judicial
decisions is that although institutions-including legal
standards-are certainly important, they are not as
determinative as the three-tier framework might suggest.
Indeed, the extant literature typically defines an institution
as a set of rules that structures an interaction, 46 not as rules
that establish outcome. Furthermore, it typically views the
choices judges make as a function of many other forces,
including personal political preferences, jurisprudential
values, personal attributes, and the external environment in
which they deliberate.47
There are multiple examples within the equal
protection realm that demonstrate the inadequacy of the
three-tier framework. 48 Commentators choose among a
wide array of disputes to justify their position-from
Romer v. Evans, in which the Court "use[d] the
heightened scrutiny mode of analysis when it claim[ed] to
legislation in selecting and defining the appropriate tier. Recent cases
have made it clear that the Court covertly employs [this] approach in
every equal protection challenge.")
46

See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 34; WALTER F. MURPHY,

ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
THE
47

See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW

(2003); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., SophisticatedVoting and GateKeeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Understandingthe Rehnquist Court: An Admiring
Reply to ProfessorMerrill, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 659 (2003); Frank B.
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts ofAppeals, 107
YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Epstein & Knight, supra note 34; Tracey
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme CourtDecision
Making, 86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323 (1992); Gerard S. Gryski et al.,
Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination
Cases, 48 J. POL. 143; DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND
AMERICAN LAW (2003); Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997).
41 See supra note 47.
49 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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be employing rational basis review;" 50 to United States v.
Virginia, in which the Court, at least according to Justice
Scalia 5 applied strict (not heightened) scrutiny to assess a
sex-based classification; to Grutterv. Bollinger,2 in which
the Court applied strict scrutiny but nonetheless upheld the
University of Michigan Law School's use of race in
admissions decisions. In short, because "the applicable
level of scrutiny remains susceptible to modificationeither ratcheted up to the most demanding standard or
reduced to the most permissive test" 3-predictability is all
but lost.
Many scholars, perhaps the majority, take issue
with the purported inconsistency as it pertains to the
highest and lowest levels of the three-tier approach. As we
foreshadowed in Part II A, they say, and have long said,
that these two extreme tiers have "evolved sub silentio so
that the highest level, strict scrutiny, equates to an almost
automatic conclusion of unconstitutionality, and the lowest,
rational basis review, leads to an equally likely result of
constitutionality." 4 These analysts are aware of Romer and
Grutter. They simply suggest that these cases are the
exceptions to the general rule, as espoused by Gerald
Gunther: strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact," while rational basis provides55"minimal scrutiny in
theory and virtually none in fact."
While proponents of the three-tier approach differ
with critics on the expectations created by the rational basis
and strict scrutiny tests, there is virtually universal
50 Srmith, supra note 3 at 476.

51See supra note 9. Justice Scalia is not alone. See supra note 8
scholarly works supporting Scalia's contention).
2 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
53 Melanie K. Morris, Ruth Bader Ginsburgand Gender Equality: A
Reassessmentof Her Contribution, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN' S L. J. 1,2021.
54 Bhagwat, supra note 43, at 270.
55 Gunther, supra note 3, at 8.
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agreement on the inherent unpredictability of the
intermediate standard. Or, as Joan Lukey puts it:
Brennan's language in Craigindicated that this
new test was more than the rational basis
standard, under which classifications were
almost always upheld. Still, it fell short of the
onus of the strict scrutiny standard, under which
almost every classification was struck down. It
seemed that the concept of 'intermediate
scrutiny' constituted a malleable, rather
indeterminate standard of review, providing
little or no guidance for lower courts-or even
for future Supreme Court cases.56
Several members of the current Supreme Court agree.
During his confirmation proceedings, Justice Souter
declared that the intermediate scrutiny test "is not good,
sound protection. It is too loose., 57 Prior to joining the
Court, Justice Ginsburg cautioned that "variance within the
federal judiciary will persist until the High Court provides
unequivocal guidance by designating sex as a suspect
classification requiring the application of strict judicial
scrutiny., 58 Dissenting in Craig,Justice Rehnquist asked:
How is this Court to divine what objectives are
important? How is it to determine whether a
particular law is 'substantially' related to the
achievement of such objective, rather than
56 Lukey, supra note 16, at 26. See also Udell, supra note 13, at 547

(arguing that "the Justices can draft such divergent opinions in their
ajplication of the intermediate scrutiny standard..
Skaggs, supra note 7, at 1190.

58 See Morris, supra note 53, at 21. Ginsburg made this claim in Brief
of Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 14,
Wengler v. DruggistsMut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (No. 79-381).
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related in some other way to its achievement?
Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and
elastic as to invite subjective judicial
preferences or prejudices relating to particular
types of legislation, masquerading as judgments
59

Two of the Court's most recent constitutional sex
discrimination decisions illustrate these concerns. In
United States v. Virginia, the U.S. government implored the
Court to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications,
an invitation that Justice Scalia, along with many scholars,
contend the majority "effectively" accepted. 60
Nevertheless, in a scathing critique of intermediate
scrutiny, Norman Deutsch writes that "[t]he shoe was on
the other foot in the Court's most recent gender case,
Nguyen v. INS.'' 61 In the course of upholding the law at
issue-one that privileges a mother over a father in
citizenship proceedings-the Nguyen majority held that the
sex-based classification achieved important government
interests and passed the heightened scrutiny test. Justice
O'Connor disagreed. In a vigorous dissent, she went so far
as to accuse the Court of explaining and applying
"heightened scrutiny... in a manner... that is a stranger to
our precedents. 62 O'Connor went on to say that:
No one should mistake the majority's analysis
for a careful application of this Court's equal
'9 Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

60 See supra note 9. See also Delchin, supra note 8 (arguing that

"while Justice Ginsburg never expressly referred to the Government's
argument in her majority opinion, several factors support Justice
Scalia's contention that the Court [adopted strict scrutiny]"); Sunstein,
supra note 8.
61 Deutsch, supra note 3, at 187.
62 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74.
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protection jurisprudence concerning sex-based
classifications. Today's decision instead
represents a deviation from a line of cases in
which we have vigilantly applied heightened
scrutiny to such classifications to determine
whether a constitutional violation has occurred.
I trust that the depth and vitality of these
precedents will ensure 63that today's error
remains an aberration.
In short, O'Connor "not so subtly implied that the majority
had, in effect, not applied
intermediate scrutiny, but
' €4
rational basis review. /
It is hardly a surprise that many scholars, regardless
of what position they take over rational basis and strict
scrutiny, have come to see that:
[D]ispute over the proper application of the
standard of review in Nguyen and Virginia is
symptomatic of the fact that intermediate
scrutiny is a 'made up' rule that has had little
effect on the outcome of the decisions .... [I]n
the end, the results in the cases turn on how the
Court and the individual Justices view the
underlying facts and policies, rather than on the
verbalization of the standard of review as
intermediate scrutiny.65
If this is true, then as long as the Court continues to invoke
the "murky" Craigrule, it will uphold or void
classifications as it sees fit; and judges on state and lower
federal courts will do the same or even "concoct" their own
63 Id. at 97.

Deutsch, supra note 3 at 187.

64

65

1d. at

187-88.
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approaches to sex discrimination. 66 As a result, all
predictability, reliability, and consistency is lost.
I. An Empirical Analysis of the Equal Protection Tests
Several commentators dispute this view of
intermediate scrutiny, claiming instead that its results are
just as determinant as the rational basis and strict scrutiny
tests. Edward Gaffney is exemplary: "If the formal
language of the standard used to evaluate claims of gender
discrimination is not strict scrutiny, it is something very
close to that sort of exacting review. It rarely meets a
classification that it likes... ,,67 while this claim may be
relatively anomalous, as the discussion above indicates, it is
nonetheless worthwhile to assess this claim against
assertions flowing from more mainstream camps that the
three-tier approach reveals either very little or a great deal
about the likely outcomes of equal protection suits, with the
notable exception of sex-discrimination litigation.
Accordingly, in what follows we undertake this
task. In Part III A, we examine empirically the degree to
which the highest and lowest tiers produce reliable
outcomes: i.e., decisions upholding classifications under a
rational basis analysis and decisions striking down
classifications under strict scrutiny. Then, in Part HI B we
explore the extent to which the intermediate test produces
predictable results.
In conducting these investigations, we focus
66 See, e.g., MEzEY, supra note 3; Brake, supra note 37; Roberta W.

Francis, Reconstitutingthe EqualRights Amendment: Policy
Implicationsfor Sex Discrimination,paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco
(2001) (on file with the authors).
7Gaffiey, supra note 12, at 396-97. See also Bowsher, supra note 7
at 317-18 (arguing that "despite the objections of three members of the
CraigCourt, intermediate scrutiny has since proven to be very

workable").
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primarily on state courts of last resort (and then on sexdiscrimination litigation), 68 even though the vast majority
of commentary has centered on the U.S. Supreme Court.
This focus reflects the difficulty of gneralizing about the
High Court's adjudication of equal protection disputes from
a small number of cases (e.g., since 1960, the Justices have
decided only 30 sex discrimination cases implicating the
Equal Protection Clause) 69 and from a lack of variation in
the standards employed (e.g., with the possible exception of
United States v. Virginia, a majority of the Court has never
applied strict scrutiny to sex-based claims) 70 . These
difficulties evaporate when we move to state supreme
courts. Since 1960, state courts of last resort have
addressed constitutional questions in 416 cases involving
sex-based classifications, and they have done so using all
three equal protection tests: rational basis, heightened
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.71
68 Throughout this article we use the terms "state court of last resort"
and "state supreme court" interchangeably, even though some state
courts of last resort are not named "supreme court."
69 We obtained this figure from MEZEY, supra note 3, at 16, which lists
the 29 cases decided between 1971 and 2001. The U.S. Supreme Court
Database identifies one case decided before 1971, Hoyt v. Florida,368
U.S. 57 (1961). U.S. Supreme Court Database, at
http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/databases.html (last accessed on
January 1,2003).
70 InFrontierov. Richardson,411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of four
Justices deemed sex a suspect class. But the four could not obtain a
fifth vote, which led to the "compromise" in Craig. See EPSTEIN &
KNIGHT, supra note 34.

7 The figure of 416-and all other data we present in this Articlecomes from a database we amassed on all constitutional sex
discrimination cases resolved in state courts of last resort between 1960
and 1999. Since that database (as well as all the documentation
necessary to use it and an explanation of how we collected the
information) is available on our web site, suffice it to note here that we
included cases in which the state justices addressed a claim of
constitutional sex discrimination and invoked an equal protection test in
the course of addressing it. See Table 1 and infra note 89; see also
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The use of different levels of scrutiny by state
supreme courts with respect to the same class of disputes
raises a number of interesting questions. Most importantly,
why do justices in one state invoke strict scrutiny, while
those in another apply the intermediate standard? On a
somewhat different note, our attempt to gain insight into
how the federal bench (especially the U.S. Supreme Court)
employs the three-tier framework by focusing on the states
and on sex discrimination raises a different set of questions.
We address these matters in Part IV. For now, let us turn to
the results of our analyses of the various tiers
encompassing the judiciary's approach to equal protection.
A. Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny
Were we to focus our empirical investigation
exclusively on the U.S. Supreme Court's use of rational
basis and strict scrutiny, it is entirely possible that we could
muster support for virtually all existing commentary.
Consider, for example, the conventional view that strict
scrutiny and rational basis lead to predicable results. Using
the former, the Court strikes classification, while under the
latter, it upholds them. If we eliminate affirmative action
cases from consideration, 72 this conventional expectation
seems to hold. Since the 1960s, for example, it is difficult
to identify a single act discriminating on the basis of race
and challenged on equal protection grounds that the
Justices upheld. Conversely, it is equally difficult to
identify a single law involving age discrimination that the
Justices struck down as a violation of equal protection. 7
infra note 90.
We return to these cases momentarily.
73 Using the U.S. Supreme Court Database (see supra note 69), we
identified five age discrimination cases in the employment realm:
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. ofRegents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Alexander
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The existence of successful challenges in the race
area only and none involving age discrimination hardly
seems a coincidence: the former are subject to strict
scrutiny, and the latter to rational basis. This distinction in
standard may explain the results we observe. The Court, in
fact, suggested as much in the recent age discrimination
case of Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents:
States may discriminate on the basis of age
without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if
the age classification in question is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. The
rationality commanded by the Equal Protection
Clause does not require States to match age
distinctions and the legitimate interests they
serve with razorlike precision.... In contrast,
when a State discriminates on the basis of race
or gender, we require a tighter fit between the
discriminatory means and the legitimate ends
they serve.... Under the Fourteenth

Amendment, a State may rely on age as a proxy
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics
that are relevant to the State's legitimate
interests. The Constitution does not preclude
reliance on such generalizations. That age
proves to be an inaccurate proxy in any
individual case is irrelevant.. ..Finally, because

an age classification is presumptively rational,
the individual challenging its constitutionality
bears the burden of proving that the "facts on
which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by

v. Fioto,430 U.S. 634 (1977); MassachusettsBd. ofRetirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). In none of the five did the Court find in
favor of the party alleging discrimination.
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the governmental decisionmaker." 74
If we incorporate affirmative action into our analysis,
however, the picture changes dramatically, lending some
support to those who proclaim the indeterminacy of even
the highest level of scrutiny. Since Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke- 75 the Court's first
major foray into the area of affirmative action-it has
decided eight constitutional cases centering on preferences
for minorities. 76 Despite the Court's use of the strict
scrutiny standard to examine the programs at issue, it
upheld four of the eight. "
What should we take away from this analysis, as
limited as it is, of the Supreme Court's use of rational basis
and strict scrutiny? Not much, as it turns out. Too few
cases exist to reach any firm conclusions. Furthermore, as
we suggested earlier, once the Court uses a particular test to
evaluate a particular type of classification, it generally stays
the course. The Court's repeated application of rational
basis in the age context is exemplary. With the possible
exception of United States v. Virginia, a majority of the
Court has never applied strict scrutiny to a sex-based
claim; 78 and in only eight cases prior to Craigdid it invoke
the rational basis standard.
In an effort to overcome these problems, we turn to
74 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
7' 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
76 We identified these cases using the U.S. Supreme Court Database.

See supra note 69.
77 The four it upheld were in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1979); UnitedStates v. Paradise,480 U.S. 149 (1987); Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. Fed. CommunicationsComm 'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Grutterv.
Bollinger, 124 S. Ct. 35 (2003). The four it struck were at issue in
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988); AdarandConstructorsv. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995); Gratzv. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
78 As we noted supra at note 70, in Frontiero,a
plurality, not a
majority, of the Justices deemed sex a suspect class.
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the states and, in particular, to how their courts of last
resort have employed the two extreme levels of scrutiny to
sex-based classifications. Since 1960, these courts have
resolved 416 constitutional sex discrimination suits. As
Figure 1 shows, minimal scrutiny is used in 45% (n=191),
strict scrutiny in 18.0 % (n=75), and a version of the Craig
intermediate standard in the remaining 150 (36.1%).79 This
is quite a bit of inter-state variation in its own right, and it
is especially noticeable when we compare it against the
U.S. Supreme Court's adjudication of sex-based
discrimination cases. Between 1960 and 2002, the Justices
heard 30 cases, using the intermediate standard, or a variant
thereof, 80in nearly 70%.

79 For information on how we defined these standards, see infra note
89.
80 See supra note 35.
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Figure 1: Use of equal protection tests in constitutional sex
discrimination litigation in state courts of last resort.
N=41681
P-

0

Rational Basis

Intermediate Scrutiny

Strict Scrutiny

Let us consider the extent to which the upper and
lower tiers produce reliable expectations about outcomes.
Do courts invoking rational basis generally uphold
classifications, while those employing strict scrutiny strike
them down? A simple comparison, as seen in Figure 2,
suggests that the answer is yes. The standard used by a
court is, to a statistically significant degree, 82 associated
81See

supra note 69 (information on the database we used to generate

this figure); see also Table 1 and infra note 89 (how we defined these
standards).
82 The association is statistically significant (Chi-Square = 62.64; p <

0.001).
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with case outcomes. Of the 191 suits in which the court
applied rational basis, the party alleging discrimination
failed to prevail in 81.2% (155 of 191); when the state
justices invoked strict scrutiny (22 of 75) the losing
percentage was only 18.8%. 83

Figure 2: Prevailing party by the application of the rational
basis and strict scrutiny tests in constitutional sex
discrimination litigation in state courts of last resort.
N=266.8 4

0 Party defending classification prevailed
Q Party challenging classification prevailed

n -A

Et /
Rational Basis

83

84

Strict Scrutiny

See
infra note
we defined
See supra
note 90
69(information
(informationon
onhow
the database
wecase
usedoutcomes).
to generate

this figure); see Table 1 and infra note 89 (how we defined these
standards); see infra note 90 (how we treated case outcomes). See also
supra note 80 for information on statistical significance.
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From Figure 2, we can say that standards and
outcomes appear to be associated in ways that many
commentators would anticipate. Unfortunately, this sort of
analysis does not enable us to make causal claims about
that relationship; that is, from a simple comparison between
standards and outcomes, we cannot claim that the standard
employed caused the court to reach a particular outcome.
There are many reasons for this, but most relevant here is
that we have considered only the effect of the particular
equal protection test on the case outcome and have failed to
take into account other factors. To the extent that we have
ignored various competing explanations, our simple
comparison suffers from the most severe form of "omitted
variable bias," making inferences reached therein suspect. 85
For example, if we believe that politics plays a role in
explaining court decisions, then failure to address the
political composition of the deciding court could lead to an
incorrect assessment of the true jurisprudential effect of
legal standards.8 6 Indeed, the impact of politics on judicial
decision making could confound our results in any number
of ways; for example, that only left-of-center courts invoke
strict scrutiny or reach decisions in favor of the party
85

Epstein & King, supra note 41; GARY

KING ET. AL., DESIGNING

SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

(1994). Omitted variable bias occurs when a statistical comparison
excludes variables that are (a) known to affect the outcome and (b)
correlate with the explanatory covariate of interest.

86 For more than six decades, political scientists and legal academics
have documented the effect of the political preferences ofjudges on the

decisions they reach. For recent examples, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL

MODEL REVISITED

(2002); Theodore W. Ruger, et al., The Supreme

CourtForecastingProject:Legal and PoliticalScience Approaches to
PredictingSupreme Court Decision-Making,COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors). See generally Lee

Epstein et al., Childress Lecture Symposium: The Political(Science)
Context of Judging,47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 783 (2003); works cited supra
note 47.

32

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

43

alleging discrimination regardless of the standard
employed.
In light of the large amount of literature suggesting
the importance of ideology, neither of these scenarios is
much of a stretch. 87 More generally, while there may be
good reasons to believe that the adoption of a higher
standard of law will generate outcomes more favorable to
parties alleging discrimination, there are equally good
reasons to question that assertion and believe that other
factors come into play. At minimum, the conventional view
about the determinacy of (the most extreme) tiers of the
Court's equal protection framework may ask too much of
institutions. While rules certainly can serve to structure
choices, it seems imprudent to believe that they do all the
work-especially when so many studies of judging suggest
otherwise.
Accordingly, we must attend to (that is "control
for") the other factors that may affect case outcomes.
Without performing statistical control, comparisons like
Figure 2 are not informative about the possible causal
relationships among the variables of interest. Also, we
ought to account for the possibility that the choice of which
test to employ may be influenced by numerous factors.8 In
87 See supra note 84.
88 To be sure, federal courts are supposed to adhere to legal principles
established by the U.S. Supreme Court, and state courts are supposed to
view federal law as establishing a floor, instead of a ceiling, on civil
rights and liberties. However, as the numerous studies, not to mention
our own reading of state cases indicate, these norms do not always hold
in this area of the law. Commentators point to federal courts that have
all but ignored the current intermediate standard and have instead
invoked higher or lower rules as they so desire; they also point to state
courts of last resort that used a rational basis standard to adjudicate sex
discrimination even after Craig. And, of course, there are states courts
that treat sex as a suspect class. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 37; Branon
P. Denning & John R. Vile, Necromancing the Equal Rights
Amendment, 17 CONST. COMM. 593 (2000); Beth Gammie, State ERAs:
Problems and Possibilities,1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1123 (1989);
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a previous analysis of the state sex discrimination data, we
took these steps, estimating a statistical model that
incorporated four factors (or "variables") to explain the
equal protection test used by the court 9 and five factors, in
addition to the test, to explain the outcome. 9° To be even
more precise, we analyzed two equations, with two
differentially measured dependent variables-the test (an
ordinal variable that can take on three values: rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny 91 ) and the outcome
Kaufmran, supra note 3; MEZEY, supra note 3; Kevin Francis O'Neill,
The Road Not Taken: State Constitutionsas an Alternative Source of
ProtectionforReproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 5
(1993). See also Part IV, in which we examine factors explaining state
courts' choice of standard.

These variables are as follows: (1) the presence or absence of a state
equal rights amendment, (2) the political ideology of the court, (3) the
proportion of the court composed of women, (4) the existence or not of
a state intermediate appellate court, and (5) whether or not the state had
ratified the national ERA. See
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (more details
on these variables); see also Epstein et al., supra note 27 (the rationale
behind including these variables).
90 In addition to the equal protection test employed by the court, these
variables are as follows: (1) the political ideology of the court, (2) the
existence or not of a state intermediate appellate court, (3) a female as
the party alleging discrimination, (4) a claim of a physical difference
between men and women, and (5) the government as a defender of the
sex-based classification. See
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (more details
on these variables); see also Epstein et al., supra note 27 (the rationale
behind including these variables).
the data and documentation on our web site; for the rationale behind
including these variables, see Epstein et al., supra note 27.
91 In the intermediate scrutiny category we also include a variation on
that standard-that the government must offer an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for discriminating on the basis of sex-which
some U.S. Supreme Court justices have endorsed. See supra note 35. In
the strict scrutiny category, we also include a standard invoked
occasionally by a few state courts-a standard that some observers
liken to strict scrutiny, while others describe as "stricter" than strict
89
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(a dichotomous variable in which the court either ruled for
or against the party alleging discrimination 92)-in one
model. Since no standard statistical model adequately
performs this task, we developed one: a bivariate mixed

response probit model, which allows for correlation across
two equations and which we estimate using maximum
likelihood. 93
scrutiny because it supposedly does not allow for sex-based
classifications. To the extent that courts qualify this "stricter" standard
with terms such as "absent compelling justifications" or in cases based
on "actual differences," however, the prohibition is not absolute,
thereby lending credence to the view that it is akin to strict scrutiny.
For our purposes, though, the key point is that it is closer, if not
identical, to strict scrutiny.
92 To code case outcome, we rely on the approach commended by
Gryski et al., supra note 47 and assess whether the party alleging sex
discrimination won or lost the dispute. In taking this route, we are well
aware of normative debates among some feminists over whether, as
Goldstein, supra note 36, at 209, puts it, "to argue for 'protective'
legislation for women on the grounds that without such legislation
women are unfairly disadvantaged by making them play by rules that
were designed with men in mind, and that are ill-adapted to women's
biology and life patterns." While we appreciate this argument, our
coding scheme remains relatively agnostic over it.
93 See Epstein et al. supra note 27, at app. B (statistical model, along
with our estimation methods). What is important here is that even
though the parameter estimates resulting from these procedures admit
to an interpretation akin to probit coefficients, our methodological
approach is distinctive in two regards. First, it enables us to estimate
parameters that, while substantively similar to those that would result
from analyzing decisions over standards of law and case outcomes
independently, are more efficient because we employ all the data to
obtain them. Second, the approach facilitates a more exacting
investigation of the dependence between the choices of standard and
outcome because we are able to obtain a precise estimate of that
dependence, in the form of an estimate of a correlation parameter, as a
result of our ability to control for the factors that may affect both the
standard and outcome in one model. Estimating this bivariate mixed
response probit model leads to the results depicted in the table belowresults that are quite striking: All the variables produce statistically
significant coefficients in the expected direction. The estimate,
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From this model, we gain a great deal of insight into
the resolution of constitutional sex discrimination cases in
the states. For example, we can now account for why state
courts adopt different standards of law to adjudicate the
same class of cases. 94 Furthermore, we can speak to the
matter directly at hand: whether different equal protection
tests lead to different results. The bivariate analysis
presented in Figure 2 suggested that they do; and, as it turns
out, this basic conclusion remains even after we control for
the other relevant factors.
In particular, from our analyses, we find that the
standard a court uses and the outcome it reaches are
significantly correlated 95-in the direction many
commentators would anticipate. Moreover, the probabilities
displayed in Figure 3 reveal that the relationship is
indicating the correlation between the equal protection test used and the

outcome reached, also attains statistical significance.
Parameter
/3
Constant
3,
ERA
/3, Judicial Ideology
/31
ERA Ratification
3
)
Proportion Women
3
/ 1
Intermediate Appellate Court
r1
Cut Point

IVELE
-1.106
0.460
0.011
0.456
2.187
0.354
1.179

/3

Constant
Judicial Ideology
Intermediate Appellate Court
Physical Difference
Government Opposition
Female

-0.794
0.017
0.376
-0.685
-0.725
0.376

p

Correlation

/32
/32

/32
32
/32

0.532

Standard
Error
0.189 *
0.120*
0.004 *
0.143 *
0.566 *
0.138 *
0.084 *
0.225
0.004
0.153
0.160
0.130
0.138

*
*
*
*

*
*

0.060 *

Maximum likelihood estimates and (asymptotic) standard errors for the
bivariate mixed response probit model fit to the constitutional sex
discrimination data. N = 416. lnL = -593.0884. * denotes statistical
significance (? = 0.05.) See supra note 87 and supra note 88
information on the variables used in this model).
We describe these results later in Part IV, in which we explore the
implications of our study.
95 See the P coefficient in the table presented in note 91 supra.
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substantively meaningful as well. Consider the two curves
at the extreme right (representing rational basis) and the
extreme left (strict scrutiny) of the figure, and notice the
monotonic increase in the odds, such that when courts
assess sex classifications via a rational basis test-the
lowest level of scrutiny-the likelihood of finding in favor
of the equality claim is just .20. That probability increases
to a rather large .73 when they invoke strict scrutiny. In
other words, and inline with much extant commentary,
application of the lowest and highest standards leads to
rather predictable outcomes-though in opposing
directions: claims of sex discrimination will, on average,
fail under a rational basis standard, and in all likelihood
prevail under strict scrutiny.
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Figure 3: Kernel density estimates of probabilities of an
outcome favoring the litigant alleging sex discrimination
given the rational basis standard (the left-most dashed line),
the intermediate standard (the middle dashed line), and the
strict scrutiny standard (the solid line). 96
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B. Heightened Scrutiny
What our analysis thus far reveals is that state court

adjudication of sex discrimination cases fits conventional
views about the predictability of results yielded by rational
basis and strict scrutiny approaches to equal protection. But
what of the in-between tier-a tier that many, if not most,
scholars suggest can lead to unexpected results? Are the
outcomes as unpredictable as so many commentators
96 These estimates account for all parameter uncertainty and were
constructed from the simulation outlined in Epstein et al. supra note 27,
at app. B. All covariates are held at their sample means. See supra note
69 (information on the database we used to generate this figure); Table
I and supra note 89 (how we defined these standards); supra note 90
(how we treated case outcomes).
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assert?
The middle curve displayed in Figure 3 (which
represents heightened scrutiny) begins to provide an
answer, and it is in the affirmative: When courts apply the
intermediate standard, the probability that a litigant alleging
discrimination will prevail is 47%. Just as many scholars
would expect, under mid-level scrutiny litigants claiming
sex discrimination are nearly as likely to win as they are to
lose. This is in contrast to the relatively predictable
outcomes generated by rational basis (under which a
litigant faces only 20% likelihood of winning) and strict
scrutiny (with a 73% probability of success).
Further analyses of the data do little to change the
basic conclusion about the predictability-or, more
pointedly, lack thereof--of the intermediate standard. For
example, if we focus exclusively on the 150 cases in which
state courts invoked this approach, we find once again, as
Figure 4 shows, that parties alleging sex discrimination lost
nearly as often as they prevailed (46.7% versus 53.3%).
Moreover, the outcomes in the 150 cases are themselves
somewhat difficult to predict. From analyses designed to
take into account the multitude of factors that may affect
court decisions, we were able to identify only a few that
were substantively significant predictors. One, notably, was
the ideology of the state justices deciding the dispute: the
more left-of-center ("liberal") the court, the more likely it
was to apply intermediate scrutiny in a way favorable to the
party alleging discrimination. Our model suggests that the
most conservative court would find for the plaintiff alleging
sex discrimination in only 26.1 % of the cases, while the
most liberal court would do so in 70.9%. The government
also plays an influential role. When it was the party
defending discrimination, the court was far more likely to
uphold the challenged classification (65.4% versus
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33.0%). 97
Figure 4: Prevailing party by application of equal
protection tests in constitutional sex discrimination
litigation in state courts of last resort. N=416. 98
E

Patydfedigclssfcaioreaie

3[]Party
Party challenging
defending classification
classificationprevailed
prevailed

F-----

0

-'-

Rational Basis

Intermediate Scrutiny

Strict Scrutiny

What these analyses tell us is that even after
controlling for a range of relevant factors, a good deal of
uncertainty remains about the conclusions state justices
reach in constitutional sex discrimination disputes when
they apply intermediate scrutiny--and those factors that
We performed this analysis using a CLARIFY-like simulation. See
infra note 109. The data and documentation necessary to reproduce
these results are available on our web site.
98 See supra note 69 (information on the database we used to
generate
this figure); Table I and supra note 89 (how we defined these
standards); supra note 90 (how we treated case outcomes).
97
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eliminate some of that uncertainty appear more related to
politics than to the legal standard. If we move to the U.S.
Supreme Court, however, even this degree of predictability
vanishes. Since Craig,the justices have resolved 20
constitutional sex equality cases on equal protection
grounds, 99 with the party alleging discrimination prevailing
in fewer than half (nine out of 20, or 45%). While there
may be some underlying explanation(s) to account for these
outcomes, we were not able to identify a single one. 10o The
Court does not seem to differentiate cases on the basis of
whether a female litigant brought the claim, as some
scholars have suggested; 10 and it is not particularly
deferential to the federal government (or the states, for that
matter) when it attempts to defend a sex-based
classification. Nor does the political ideology of the
justices seem to exert much impact on their resolution of
these cases. Though given the small number of cases we
do not want to make too much of these findings, the latter
is especially surprising in light of the large number of
empirical studies ascribing a significant role for ideology in
Court decision-making.' 02
IV. Implications of the Analysis for Discrimination
Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation

99 See MEZEY, supra note 3.
100 We considered four basic variables (under different measurements
and specification): the ideology of the court, the presence or absence of
women justices, whether a woman was claiming discrimination, and
whether a government defended a sex-based classification. We
measured the Court's ideology using the Segal & Cover scores. See
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes
of U.S. Supreme CourtJustices, 83 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 557 (1989). See
[http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/sexdiscrimination.html] (data and
documentation necessary to reproduce these analyses).
101 See Baer, supra note 40.
102 See, e.g., studies cited in supra note

47 and supra note 84.
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Given the results of our analyses, it would be
difficult to take issue with Andrew Koppelman's
conclusion about intermediate scrutiny. Even though he
advocates treating laws that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation as sex discriminaion for purposes of
equal protection analysis, 10 3 he recognizes that the sex
discrimination argument is not free from indeterminacy.
The question inevitably arises as to whether the state can
offer an adequate justification for what it has done, and
then a court must balance the interests involved in a way
that will unavoidably allow for judicial discretion. 104
Our findings about the apparent indeterminacy of
heightened scrutiny, not to mention our results reinforcing
the relative predictability of rational basis and strict
scrutiny, may lend support to Koppelman's conclusion.
But what lessons should we take from our study? We see
two as particularly important, one pertaining to the future
of sex discrimination litigation, and the other, to the
advancement of legal rights for gays.
We take up both in what follows. But before doing
so, an important cautionary note is in order: Because we
largely base these implications on analyses of state court
decisions, we cannot state with any certainty the extent to
which they transport to all American courts. More
pointedly, using knowledge that we have gained from
investigations of state cases to make inferences about
federal litigation is a risky business indeed. The types of
suits may differ, 10 5 as well as the parties, 106 to name just
two points of distinction. Nonetheless, in light of the
severe problems of addressing debates over equal
103 See Koppelman, supra note 14.
104 Id. at 535-36.
105 For example, state courts typically do not resolve questions
concerning federal immigration law or the military draft.

106 For example, the U.S. government was not a participant in any of
the 416 state cases in our database.
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protection with reference only to federal courts, the state
judiciary provides an antidote. For example, only by
looking to the states-some of which have invoked strict
scrutiny to resolve sex discrimination suits-were we able
to get a handle on the counterfactual world: one in which
federal courts deem sex a suspect class. And only by
looking to the states, as we explain below, are we able to
isolate those factors that could move sex-based litigation
from the counterfactual to the factual: from a federal
judiciary that now applies the intermediate standard to one
that instead employs strict scrutiny.
A. Sex DiscriminationLitigation
Throughout this article we have noted various
expressions of dissatisfaction with intermediate scrutiny.
While the critiques are many in number, one standing
above virtually all others is the test's indeterminacy. From
the vantage point of equality, the in-between approach may
generate "better" outcomes than the traditional rational
basis standard but it is highly unpredictable in application.
Our study confirms the veracity of this critique. As
Figure 3 makes clear, if we believe it is desirable for courts
to produce a larger number of equality-oriented outcomes,
then heightened scrutiny better serves that objective than
rational basis. Controlling for a host of other relevant
factors, litigants challenging sex-based classifications are
more than twice as likely to prevail now than they were
prior to Craig. On the other hand, their odds, even under
the intermediate test, are no better than 50-50, a far cry
from the likelihood of victory under strict scrutiny-73%.
What these results underscore is a claim that
advocates for women's rights have long made: the
importance of elevating sex to a suspect class.10 7 Until the
107

See, e.g., MEzEY, supra note 3; Brake, supra note 37; Francis, supra
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Supreme Court takes this step, federal courts will continue
to employ the amorphous intermediate rule, sometimes
upholding sex-based classification and sometimes voiding
them-with little predictability.
On this much many agree. The question, of course,
is how to alter the current standard. Our investigation into
why state tribunals apply the equal protection tests supplies
two answers. One is the existence of an equal rights
amendment; the other is the presence of women on the
bench.
1. Equal Rights Amendments (ERA)
Beginning with an ERA, scholars have long argued
that the adoption of a federal ERA will force jurists to
elevate sex to a suspect class, which in turn will lead them
classifications, as they
to eradicate virtually all sex-based
08
now do in the case of race.1
note 64. See also infra note 108.
108 Elevating sex to a suspect class was a primary motivation for the
drive for (and against) the ERA in the 1970s. See, e.g., WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
(1997); HERMA H. KAY, SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION: TEXT, CASES
AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1988); Mary E. Becker, Obscuringthe
Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security, and Stone, Seidman,
Sunstein & Tushnet's ConstitutionalLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 264
(1989); Brown, supra note 28; Mary Anne Case, Reflections on
ConstitutionalizingWomen's Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 765 (2002);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment is the Way, 1
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1978); Kaufman, supra note 3; Catharine A.
MacKinnon, UnthinkingERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 759 (1987);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, ConstitutionalizingWomen 's Equality, 90
CALIF. L. REv. 735 (2002); Francis, supra note 66; Note, Sex
Discriminationand Equal Protection:Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499 (1971). On other hand, some
scholars argue that a formal rule, such as an ERA, will not effectively
end the subordination of women by men at least in part because of the
prevalence of male dominance in most facets of social, political and
economic life. We do not attempt to assess this position, but our
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Our exploration of the standards used in sex-based
discrimination cases supplies some confirmation of the
importance of an equal rights amendment, which over onethird of the states have now incorporated into their
constitutions-with many containing similar language and
purporting to carry analogous objectives as the federal
ERA.'o9 What we find, after controlling for all other
relevant factors," 0 is that the presence of an ERA
significantly increases the odds of a court adopting a higher
equal protection test. Specifically, when we set all other
variables at their mean, the likelihood, on average, of a
court invoking strict scrutiny to adjudicate a sex-based
claim is just 11% in the absence of an ERA. That
probability doubles to 23% when an ERA is in effect.
Of course, because this figure of .23 is relatively
distant from 1.00, it is far from certain that an ERA will
assure the application of strict scrutiny. But it does raise
the probability of state jurists taking that step-and it may
very well have the same effect on U.S. Supreme Court
justices. In fact, in the early 1970s several declined to
elevate sex to a suspect class at least in part because they
thought it "inappropriate to 'amend' the Constitution while
the ERA was pending.""'
analysis does lend support to the claims of others who argue that formal
equality provisions are not always inefficacious, but rather their

effectiveness depends a good deal on who is interpreting them.
Specifically, to foreshadow our results, we find that as the fraction of
women serving on a state supreme court increases, the likelihood of the

court adopting a higher standard of law also increases-and
significantly increases at that. See Part IV.
109 See, e.g., Susan Crump, An Overview of the Equal Rights
Amendment in Texas, 11 Hous. L. REv. 136 (1973); Andrea J. Farone,
The FloridaEqual Rights Amendment: Raising the StandardApplied to

Gender Under the Equal Protection Clause of the FloridaConstitution,

1 FL. COASTAL L.J. 421 (2000).
110 See supra note 91.
1 1ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 108, at 78; see also Ginsburg,

supra note 108.
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The Court's declination came at a time when the
ERA's passage looked promising. What about now, some
thirty years later? What are the odds of adding an ERA to
the U.S. Constitution? Addressing this question is beyond
the scope of this article so we will only note here that,
despite pronouncements in the 1980s to the contrary, the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) may not be dead.
Actually, there are signs that the battle may be heating up
yet again. 112 For example, the "three-state" strategy
deployed by organized interests in response to claims
appearing in scholarly journals, policy memoranda, and the
press that ratification of the 27th Amendment in 1992over 200 years after it was proposed-may hold
implications, if not promise, for the ERA." 3 To be sure,
this "reconstituted" drive for the ERA has generated
substantial opposition (especially from Phyllis Schlafly and
her Eagle Forum), but it may very well succeed in Illinois,
where in 2003 65% of voters supported ratification and
only 19% did not (17% had no opinion). 114 Another sign is
the increasing importance attached to the Amendment in
academic and media treatments. By way of illustration,
consider that in the first six months of 1993, just 186 news
articles made mention of the ERA. For the same period in
2003, the number of news articles that mentioned the ERA
was more than double (N=471) the amount of the
corresponding period in 1993.115 Yet a final indication of
the rising importance of the ERA comes from legal
commentators. A passage from Judge Martha Daughtrey's
112 Epstein et al., supra note 27.
113 See, e.g., Denning & Vile, supra note 88. But see Georgia Duerst-

Lahti, Time To Ratify the EqualRights Amendment, NEWSDAY, May
20, 2003, at A30; Ellen Goodman, EqualRights Amendment is Not
Dead Yet, NEW ORLEANS TIMEs-PICAYuNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at B5.
114 Christi Parsons, Not So Controversialto Voters: Poll Says Many
Back Gay Rights, ERA, Gun Limits, Cn. TRIB., June 17, 2003, at C1.
115 We obtained these figures from a LEXIS search (in the news group
file) on the term "Equal Rights Amendment."
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Madison Lecture, delivered at New York University,
provides but one example:
In the course of cleaning out closets
and drawers that bad collected much too
much stuff over a dozen years, I found this
political button, brought home-as I
recall-from an ABA meeting some years
ago. It reads: "Happy Birthday E.R.A.
1923-1993, You Are Long Overdue!"
About the same time that I found the
button, the ABA Journal published a cover
story on the renewed efforts to amend the
United States Constitution to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender. As it
turns out, the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) which, if ratified, would have
become the twenty-seventh amendment to
the Federal Constitution-but which "died"
for lack of ratification by three additional
states in 1982-has been reintroduced in the
current session of Congress. The prospect
of a renewed effort to pass the ERA in
Congress and to mount ratification
campaigns in the fifty state legislatures
raises a number of questions that I would
116
like to explore with you this evening.
Whether the "renewed effort" of which Judge Daughtrey
speaks will succeed we cannot say. What does seem to be
the case is that the bulk of contemporary commentary now
suggests that the ERA may be as dead as the 19th
Amendment, which took over 40 years to gain

116

Daughtrey, supra note 6, at 2-3 (citations omitted).
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ratification.

7

2. Women on the Bench
Certainly our results indicate that ERAs are
important components in the quest for the eradication of
sex-based discrimination because they increase the
probability of a court applying a higher standard of law to
adjudicate claims of sex discrimination. Furthermore, the
application of a higher standard of law, even after
controlling for other relevant factors, increases the
probability of a court reaching a disposition favorable to
litigants alleging a violation of their rights.
An ERA is not, however, the only factor that lifts
the odds of the adoption of strict scrutiny. As some
scholars have long speculated, the proportion of women on
the deciding court also exerts a statistically significant
effect. 118 As that proportion increases, the probability of
117 See Francis, supra note 66 (parallels between the campaigns for
ratification of the 19th Amendment and the ERA).
118 Virtually from the day Suzanna Sherry penned her classic work
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72
VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) on the possibility of a "feminine"
jurisprudence, scholars have hotly debated whether female judges
"speak in a different voice." For recent reviews of this literature, see
Herma Hill Kay & Geraldine Sparrow, Workshop on Judging:Does
Gender Make a Difference?, 16 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2001); Daniel
M. Schneider, EmpiricalResearch on JudicialReasoning: Statutory
Interpretationin FederalTax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REv. 325 (2001).
While the results of various research projects exploring whether male
and female judges vote differently reach decidedly mixed results, those
centering on jurisprudence (Sherry's original target)-especially in the
area of sex discrimination-are clearer. A consensus now exists that
women have "pushed the law forward in sex discrimination cases" with
their distinct approach to legal principles possibly altering the choices
made by their male colleagues. Kay & Sparrow, at 11. See, e.g.,
Sherry; Sullivan, supra note 106. Our study lends empirical support to
this growing consensus. At minimum, it seems rather clear that the
presence of women on state judiciaries exerts an influence on how
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applying a higher standard of law soars even after
controlling for the presence (or absence) of an ERA.
To see the magnitude of the effect, consider a court
composed exclusively of male justices. On average, the
odds of that court using a rational basis standard, setting all
other variables at their mean, is a hefty .50; the probability
of that same court applying strict scrutiny is but. 12. Now
consider a court nearly equally divided between male and
female judges: the probabilities nearly reverse. The odds of
this court applying rational basis are, on average, but 14%
while the probability for strict scrutiny jumps to 47%.
This result commends a rather pointed strategy for
those seeking more equality-oriented outcomes in court
cases, a campaign designed to bring more women to the
federal judiciary. Surely the ultimate target would be the
U.S. Supreme Court: with one more favorably disposed
justice, a majority supporting strict scrutiny could

emerge. 1 9 Of course, history shows that the new justice
need not be a woman; after all, it was William J. Brennan
who was among the first to urge his colleagues to elevate
sex to a suspect class.120 On the other hand, it is perhaps 22
no
2
coincidence that it is Justices O'Connor' ' and Ginsburg
who continue to push the United States v. Virginia
standard-a standard some say is more akin to strict
courts adjudicate sex-based claims.
119 This assumes that the four dissenters in Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (2001),
the Court's most recent sex-discrimination case, who invoked the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" of the VA/ case to support their
views, would be willing to elevate sex to a suspect class. Surely this is
true of Justice Ginsburg, who may have viewed VA as the first step in
that direction. See Skaggs, supra note 7; Stobaugh, supra note 8;
Morris, supra note 53. It is not so clear that Justices Breyer, O'Connor,
and Souter viewed the VMI case in the same way.
120 See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 677 (Brennan's judgment for the Court).
121 See, e.g., Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor's dissent).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 588 U.S. at 519 (Ginsburg
writing the majority opinion of the Court).
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scrutiny than it is to Craig.1
Nonetheless, however important the U.S. Supreme
Court, ignoring the lower appellate bench in any campaign
designed to increase the number of female judges would be
123 See supra note 8; supra note 9. See also Linda Greenhouse, From
the High Court,A Voice Quite Distinctly a Woman's, N.Y. TIMEs, May
26, 1999, at Al. Greenhouse writes that Ginsburg:
recounted in a 1997 speech to the Women's Bar
Association... that a year earlier, as she announced
her opinion declaring unconstitutional the all-male
admissions policy at the Virginia Military Institute,
she looked across the bench at Justice O'Connor and
thought of the legacy they were building together.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in the Virginia
case cited one of Justice O'Connor's earliest majority
opinions for the Court, a 1982 decision called
Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan that
declared unconstitutional the exclusion of male
students from a state-supported nursing school.
Justice O'Connor, warning against using "archaic
and stereotypic notions" about the roles of men and
women, herself cited in that opinion some of the
Supreme Court cases that Ruth Ginsburg, who was
not to join the Court for another 11 years, had argued
and won as a noted women's rights advocate during
the 1970's.
Addressing the women's bar group, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the vote in Justice O'Connor's
1982 opinion was 5 to 4, while the vote to strike
down men-only admissions in Virginia 14 years later
was 7 to 1.
"What occurred in the intervening years in
the Court, as elsewhere in society?" Justice Ginsburg
asked. The answer, she continued, lay in a line from
Shakespeare that Justice O'Connor had recently
spoken in the character of Isabel, Queen of France, in
a local production of "Henry V": "Haply a woman's
voice may do some good."
See also Daughtrey, supranote 6, at 21-22.
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in error. Since change from the "bottom up" is not
unknown in American legal history, 124 it is always possible
that women serving in the circuits could exert "hydraulic
pressure" on the Supreme Court, forcing it reevaluate its
current standard. 25 Yet, at the time of this writing, less
An interesting example along these lines comes from early legal
debates over how to define obscenity. While the U.S. Supreme Court
until the 1950s clung to a highly restrictive definition developed in the
British case ofRegina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), the lower
federal courts were liberalizing or even rejecting that definition.
Among the most prominent examplars is Judge Augustus Hand's
opinion in United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses" by James
Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (1934). See EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at
359-60.
125 In the legal annals, the term "hydraulic pressure" (usually
associated
with public pressure on the Court) has taken on a negative connotation
owing to its use by Justice Holmes in his dissent in Northern Securities
Company v. United States:
124

Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real
importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests
exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes
what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even well settled principles of law will bend.
193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1903). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 405 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The 'hydraulic pressure[s]'
that Holmes spoke of as being generated by cases of great import have
propelled the Court to go beyond the limits ofjudicial power, while
fortunately leaving some room for legislative judgment."); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 867 (1991) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The
great tragedy of the decision, however, is the danger that the "hydraulic
pressure" of public opinion that Justice Holmes once described-and
that properly influences the deliberations of democratic legislatures
... ."); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 505
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Well-settled principles of law are bent
today by the Court under that kind of 'hydraulic pressure."'). But
pressure can, of course, come from sources other than public opinion,
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than 25% of the seats on the federal circuit courts are
occupied by female judges (32 of 134),126 meaning that the
odds of attaining a panel with two women, much less three,
are rather small- and, for some circuits, border on trivial,
as Table 2 indicates. A strategy aimed at increasing these
figures, if successful and if our analysis of the state courts
transports to the federal judiciary, would likely help, and
not impede, the goal of elevating sex to a suspect class.

and it is equally as certain that pressure to change problematic
principles of law, even if well-settled, is hardly the tragedy that some of
these statements suggest.
126

Data are available at

http://www.alliancefojustice.org/judicial/judicial-selection_resources/
selectiondatabase/activejudges.asp (last accessed on December 31,

2003).
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Table 2: The gender composition of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. Each cell represents the probability of panel
composed of a particular combination of male (M) and
female (F) judges across the appellate courts,
assuming
27
panels.1
three-judge
of
assignment
random

C<ircuit
(Gender Compostion)
'

Probability
Three
Female

of a Panel
f
Two
One
Fernales
Pbrrale

1 t (4 M; 1 F)
(7 M; 2 F)
2 -d
ard
( 7 M; 4 P)

0.00
0.00
0.02

0.00
0.08
0 26

0.60
0.50
0.51

4
t
5
t
6
t
7
t
8t
9

0.00
0.01
0.08
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00

0.06
0.15
0.42
0.07
0.00
0.13
0.15
0.00
000

0.44
0.51
0.42
0.47
0.38
0.46
0.51
0.33
0.43

0.01

0.11

0.46

t h
h
h
h
h
h

(9 M; 2 F)
(8 M; 3 F)
(5 M; 5 P)
(8 M; 2 F)
(7 M; 1 F)
(15 M; 5 F)

t h

10
(8
t h
II
(8
D.C. (6
Mean

M; 3 F)
M; 1 F)
M; 1 F)

B. DiscriminationAgainst Gays and Lesbians
In an effort to eradicate discrimination against gays
and lesbians, commentators have proposed a number of
doctrinal avenues. 128 One, the Due Process Clause, proved
The data on gender composition are as of January 1, 2003 (derived
from
http://www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial/judicialselectionresources/
selectiondatabase/activejudges.asp and do not include vacancies.
Assuming random assignment of federal appellate judges to panels, we
calculated the probabilities in accord with simple probability rules. See
127

generally SHELDON Ross, A FIRST COURSE

IN PROBABILITY

24-63 (6th

ed. 2002).
128 For reviews, see ESKRIDGE &HUNTER, supra note 108;
Massaro,
supra note 14; ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
AMERICAN LAW (2002). For a critique of many of these arguments, see

53

64

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY [VOL. I, 1]

successful in Lawrence v. Texas. 29 That has not, however,
diminished the importance of equal protection in the battle
30
to eradicate classifications based on sexual orientation. 1
Along these lines, scholars have suggested two
chief courses of action. Some urge the application of
heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate between
homosexuals and heterosexuals, that is, these commentators
"seek to gamer intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays.'' 131
Another group suggests that discrimination against gays
and lesbians is, in fact, discrimination based on sex.
Hence, courts should apply the sane level of scrutiny to
classifications based on sexual orientation as they now do
for laws that amount to sex discrimination. 132
Cass Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1
(1994); but see Massaro's cogent response, supra note 14.
129 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472. But see Post, supra note 24. Post
claims that passages in the opinion are framed in the language of equal
protection. Indeed, the Court itself seemed to "meld" equal protection
and due process when it wrote that "[e]quality of treatment and the due
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,"
though it added that "a decision on the latter point advances both
interests." 123 S.Ct. at 2482.
130 See Massaro supra note 14; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996).
131 See Yoshino, supra note 14; Shalleck, supra note 14. See generally
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Along similar
lines, some scholars and judges have proposed applying strict scrutiny
to discrimination based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Renee Culverhouse &
Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L. REV.
205 (1993); Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,98 HARv. L. REv. 1285.
Our analysis below speaks to this proposal as well.
132 See Clausen, supra note 14; Koppelman, supra note 14; Law, supra
note 14; Massaro, supra note 14; Pharr,supra note 14. See also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 130, at 162 (noting that in Baehr v. Lewin, the
court adopted the argument that "the state's refusal to gixe marriage
licenses to same-sex couples is sex discrimination... [T]he Hawaii
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This last argument has some appeal: if courts treat
sex as a suspect class and if they place discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation under the rubric of sex
discrimination, then the odds are high of eradicating
whatever classification is at issue. This is the central
message of our study; and it is the lesson of Baehr v.
Lewin, as well.
In that case, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii treated the denial of same-sex marriages as sex
discrimination and applied strict scrutiny-the standard it
uses, owing to the presence of state ERA, to assess sexbased classifications. But the argument for treating
discrimination against gays and lesbians as sex
discrimination- as well as, of course, proposals seeking to
"garner intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays"--loses
some of its appeal in the current federal context, as well as
in most states. In those arenas, sex is not treated as a
suspect class, but subject to intermediate scrutiny, which,
as we have demonstrated throughout, is far less likely to
lead to equality-oriented outcomes.
This demonstration, however, is not meant to
suggest that advocates for gay rights should eschew an
equal protection strategy designed to attain heightened
constitutional scrutiny. Actually, we, along with many
legal scholars, see benefits to this approach-some of
which are symbolic, but others, quite practical. For one
thing, as our data suggest, moving from rational basis to
intermediate scrutiny will, in all likelihood, further the
cause of gay rights. Indeed, if the results presented here
generalize across the judiciary and transport from sex
discrimination to sexual orientation, the probability of
success in court will double. For another, as Ruth Bader
Ginsburg points out, the elevation of sex from rational basis
to heightened scrutiny has had salutary effects that
court made the right decision.").
133 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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transcend the courtroom:
The Supreme Court, since the 1970s, has
effectively carried on in the gender
discrimination cases a dialogue with the
political branches of government. The Court
wrote modestly, it put forth no grand
philosophy. But by forcing legislative and
executive branch re-examination of sex-based
classifications, the Court helped to ensure that
laws and regulations would catch up with a
changed world. 134
On the other hand, there are costs associated with
the strategic pursuit of heightened scrutiny in the name of
advancing the legal rights of gays. Primarily, if courts
began to apply the mid-level test to classifications based on
sexual orientation-either by treating them as a separate
class or folding them into sex discrimination-they would,
in all likelihood, abide by that standard for the foreseeable
future if constitutional sex discrimination litigation is any
indication. To see this danger, we need only to recall that
the test established in Craignearly 30 years ago remains
the test that the Court applies today despite efforts on the
part of Justice Ginsburg and others to "ratchet it up.""13 5
That principles of law endure is no great surprise.
As we noted earlier, 136 if courts do not follow previously
established rules of law, or do so in unpredictable ways,
they risk undermining their fundamental efficacy, for
members of legal and political communities base their
future expectations on the belief that others will follow
134 Ruth B. Ginsburg, ConstitutionalAdjudication in the United States
as a Means ofAdvancing the Equal Stature ofMen and Women Under
the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 270 (1997).
135 See supra note 6.
136 See supra note 42.
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existing rules. However, this phenomenon does not appear
to be the case with regard to Craig, which has generated
unpredictable results in the sex discrimination area and may
very well do the same in constitutional cases centering on
sexual orientation. Advocates for gay rights can expect, if
our results are any indication, to lose as many cases as they
win, with the equal protection test itself providing little
guidance to differentiate between the two.
By explicating these problems, we emphasize once
again that our goal is not to deter advocates from following
the equal protection path (especially in the event of the
Court elevating sex to a suspect class). It is rather to
persuade members of the legal community to undertake an
analysis of its particular costs and benefits-whether with
our data or with other, more tailored observations.
V. Conclusion
For nearly thirty years now, the U.S. Supreme Court
employed
a "heightened scrutiny" test to adjudicate
has
constitutional claims of sex discrimination. While some
commentators endorse this approach, far more have
questioned it. Their critiques are varied in message and
many in number, but chief among them is the test's
seeming lack of determinacy: because the test is so
"amorphous" it fails to establish reliable expectations about
the results of sex-discrimination litigation.
Our empirical results put this normative critique on
stronger footing. We find that when courts apply the
intermediate standard, litigants alleging sex discrimination
are nearly as likely to win as they are to lose. This finding
is in marked contrast to the relatively predicable outcomes
generated when courts apply strict scrutiny, under which
most parties challenging sex-based classifications prevail.
For those desiring a larger number of equalityoriented outcomes, the task is to convince courts to elevate
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sex to a suspect class. We supplied several strategies for
accomplishing this objective, and surely others exist. Until
one or more succeeds, however, Ginsburg's cautionary
not
remark of two decades ago remains apt: "variance," and
1 37
persist.
will
judiciary
federal
the
"within
uniformity,

137

Ginsburg, supra note 58.

58

